A Morally Driven Definition of Rebellion?

first, some terms:

Consequentialism: the doctrine that the morality of an action is to be judged solely by its consequences.

Evaluative Consequentialism: moral rightness depends only on the value of the consequences

Agent-Neutral Consequentialism: impartiality between self and others when evaluating consequences 

=> Agent-Neutral Evaluative Consequentialism is the utilitarian ideal.

Deontological ethics: judges the morality of an action based on the action’s adherence to a set of rules

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is the space where agent-neutral evaluative consequentialism deviates from deontic ethics the definition of morally driven rebellion?  This seems conceptually trivial, but interesting in practice. what are some examples of this? #What does decision theory in this space look like?[1]

“All evolution in thought and conduct must at first appear as heresy and misconduct.” – George Bernard Shaw

“It is not necessary that the end which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the end at which we consciously aim.” (Sidgwick)

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[1] SEP Consequentialism non-decision theory: most classic and contemporary utilitarians and consequentialists do not propose their principles as decision procedures. (Bales 1971) Bentham wrote, “It is not to be expected that this process [his hedonic calculus] should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment.” (1789, Chap. IV, Sec. VI) Mill agreed, “it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large.” (1861, Chap. II, Par. 19) Sidgwick added, “It is not necessary that the end which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the end at which we consciously aim.” (1907, 413)

Instead, most consequentialists claim that overall utility is the criterion or standard of what is morally right or morally ought to be done. Their theories are intended to spell out the necessary and sufficient conditions for an act to be morally right, regardless of whether the agent can tell in advance whether those conditions are met. Instead, most consequentialists claim that overall utility is the criterion or standard of what is morally right or morally ought to be done. Their theories are intended to spell out the necessary and sufficient conditions for an act to be morally right, regardless of whether the agent can tell in advance whether those conditions are met.

Utilitarians regularly argue that most people in most circumstances ought not to try to calculate utilities, because they are too likely to make serious miscalculations that will lead them to perform actions that reduce utility. It is even possible to hold that most agents usually ought to follow their moral intuitions, because these intuitions evolved to lead us to perform acts that maximize utility, at least in likely circumstances (Hare 1981, 46–47). Some utilitarians (Sidgwick 1907, 489–90) suggest that a utilitarian decision procedure may be adopted as an esoteric morality by an elite group that is better at calculating utilities, but utilitarians can, instead, hold that nobody should use the principle of utility as a decision procedure.

there is nothing incoherent about proposing a decision procedure that is separate from one’s criterion of the right.

Others object that this move takes the force out of consequentialism, because it leads agents to ignore consequentialism when they make real decisions. However, a criterion of the right can be useful at a higher level by helping us choose among available decision procedures and refine our decision procedures as circumstances change and we gain more experience and knowledge. Hence, most consequentialists do not mind giving up consequentialism as a direct decision procedure as long as consequences remain the criterion of rightness.

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